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Productivity and Automation in Automotive Manufacturing:  
The Impact on Ohio Employment 
 
 The supposed decline of the United States manufacturing industry has been a central 
topic of political concerns and research for decades. The classic story is that America’s might in 
this sector was seen as the backbone of the economy and a central factor in the nation’s 
economic dominance relative to the rest of the world. In light of this, it’s easy to see how a 
decline in the manufacturing base has become such an important issue. In recent years, two main 
theories have emerged as to what is to blame for the loss American manufacturing jobs over the 
last two decades: trade agreements and improving technology (or automation). The general 
argument regarding trade is that the expansion of globalization in the last few decades, via trade 
agreements like NAFTA, have led to companies closing down American factories and moving 
production to other nations in order to take advantage of cheaper labor. While this certainly 
provides rich grounds for research, having inspired much already, this particular paper will 
instead focus on the impact of technology and automation. In this case, the argument proposes 
that technological advancements over the last 3 decades have caused a major shift in the 
workplace. The idea is that technology has dramatically improved productivity and efficiency, so 
much so that many jobs that were once performed by humans can now be performed by robotics 
or other technological systems. In this way, some workers have effectively become obsolete, 
leading to declining employment numbers due to lack of demand for actual human labor. Much 
research has been done on this topic as well, which will be discussed at length in the following 
section. This paper aims to make its unique contribution to the literature by looking specifically 
at the impact of technology on productivity in the automotive manufacturing sector, an important 
subset of the overall manufacturing sector (particularly to a certain geographic region). 
 The issue at hand in the research paper is, simply put: has technology been a driver of 
productivity growth in the automotive manufacturing industry in the US?  If so, what has been 
the impact on the level of employment in this sector? More specifically, this paper will focus on 
the state of Ohio. The impact of technology on productivity and employment is of interest here 
because of the aforementioned body of research that exists on this topic for the manufacturing 
sector broadly. The answers to these questions will have large implications for future policy. 
Automotive manufacturing jobs have historically been some of the most central sources of 
employment for the American middle class. This is especially true of the “Rust Belt” region of 
the country, which historically is largely dependent on the manufacturing industry. Changes in 
the labor market for autoworkers stand to impact a significant portion of the population and 
economy, and it therefore stands to reason that this problem should be researched to consider 
what issues exist and how a proper policy response can be formulated. 
 Previous research lays the groundwork for this paper by providing a look at the effects of 
technology on the economy, workers, and the manufacturing sector generally. A 2011 piece from 
Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee, entitled Race Against the Machine: How the Digital 
Revolution is Accelerating Innovation, Driving Productivity, and Irreversibly Transforming 
Employment and the Economy provides a general sense of the trends of technological 
advancement. In a summary paper published in 2012, the authors describe how they studied the 
impact of technology on jobs, skills, wages, and the overall economy in the wake of the “Great 
Recession.” Their central argument is that the slow recovery from the recession is not fully 
explained by simple cyclical weakness in demand. Rather, they propose that technology has 
advanced at such a rapid pace that many workers have effectively been left behind. Computer-
driven technologies are called a “General Purpose Technology” by the authors, on par with the 
steam engine, electricity, and the internal combustion engine in terms of ability to alter 
productivity. They believe that recent technological improvements (in tandem with those that are 
on the near horizon) essentially constitute a new industrial revolution, one that has rendered 
human labor obsolete in many tasks. The piece strongly supports the hypothesis of automation 
being a major job killer. While the authors do note that there are some areas in which humans 
still have the upper hand, such as problem solving and creativity, they urge serious consideration 
of this issue so that humanity can structure production in such a way as to take advantage of the 
technological revolution rather than lose the “race against the machine.” It should be noted here 
that the evidentiary standards for popular books such as this are not quite as robust as those 
required for formal academic research. This is not to imply the conclusions are incorrect; 
however, the reason this piece is mentioned here is due to its role in increasing the popularity of 
this line of inquiry and promoting awareness of the general idea and its implications. For those 
reasons, it is worth including in this literature review. 
 Another 2011 piece by Fleck, Glaser, and Sprague gives potential insight into the 
relationship between productivity and wages. The approach taken is to examine trends in 
productivity growth compared to trends in compensation, both in the total nonfarm business 
sector and the manufacturing subset of this sector. What they found is that compensation tended 
to closely follow productivity for decades, with gains in wages matching the gains in 
productivity from 1947 until the late 1970s. However, beginning in 1980, a new pattern emerged. 
Productivity continued a steady rise, commensurate with previous trends. Compensation, 
however, began to lag; it still increased overall, but at a much slower rate than productivity. In 
the manufacturing industry, the results were more interesting – and more relevant to consider for 
this paper. Since 1980, productivity in manufacturing increased, at times at a rate even faster 
than in the preceding decades. However, real compensation effectively flat lined, experiencing 
little to no gains over the same time period. This stark finding helps provide some support for the 
hypothesis of automation, as it has been interpreted as evidence of a de-coupling of productivity 
and wages. In other words, lagging wages in the face of increasing productivity could show that 
technology is driving these improvements rather than worker skill – and therefore companies are 
replacing workers with machines. This also has the implication that the monetary gains from 
increased productivity are not accruing to workers, but rather, the owners of capital.  
 In 2014, authors Daron Acemoglu, David Autor, David Dorn, Gordon H. Hanson, and 
Brendan Price took on the question of productivity in manufacturing in their 2014 paper Return 
of the Solow Paradox? IT, Productivity, and Employment in US Manufacturing. Their research is 
similar to the purpose of this paper, although their focus is on manufacturing more broadly rather 
than a specific type of manufacturing. The authors looked to find whether technology has 
boosted productivity in US manufacturing. Initially using a measure of computer investments as 
a marker for technology use, they found little evidence of productivity growth (excluding 
computer-producing firms). However, upon switching their measure to account for usage of 
advanced manufacturing technologies, there was evidence of productivity growth throughout the 
1980s and 1990s, will a tailing-off in the 2000s. They then turn their focus to discovering the 
source of this increased productivity – did it come from increased output, or fewer workers? This 
yielded interesting results. Analysis showed that, although output was actually declining relative 
to other industries, employment was actually falling at a faster rate. Thus, declining employment 
was responsible for the productivity gains. Though this could appear to support the idea of 
displacement by automation, the authors caution that the timing appears inconsistent with this 
conclusion. Employment losses occurred throughout the 1990s, but actually stopped into the 
2000s – indicative of the previously mentioned tailing-off of productivity growth at this time. 
Therefore, the takeaway is that the so called “Solow Paradox” may not yet be resolved. 
Productivity gains from technology were mixed, and largely dependent upon the measure used. 
Though job loss did occur, the overall findings are not consistent with the automation hypothesis 
– at least not in US manufacturing.  
 The last paper which we will examine for background information comes from Acemoglu 
and Restrepo, published in 2019. In a sense, Automation and New Tasks: How Technology 
Displaces and Reinstates Labor picks up where the previous paper left off. Acemoglu and 
Restrepo attempted to deal with the conflicting ideas and conclusions regarding the impact of 
technology on labor by creating a model based on actual tasks performed. Their model was 
meant to show how machines can alter that balance. The authors explained that the introduction 
of new technology can impact labor in one of three ways. The first, called the Displacement 
Effect, occurs when machines take over tasks formerly performed by labor. The Productivity 
Effect is when a flexible allocation of tasks is possible, and automation can therefore increase 
productivity and boost demand for labor in non-automated tasks – put simply, the machines are 
so efficient that more people are needed to meet the increased demand for related goods whose 
production is not automated. Last is the Reinstatement effect, which occurs when technology 
creates new tasks in which labor has the comparative advantage; this effectively fights the 
displacement effect, as it means that increased technology usage will also result in an increase in 
the demand for labor. The authors argued that the impact on the labor force depends on which of 
these effects is strongest for a given technology. In applying their model, they found that recent 
stagnation of labor demand is in fact explained by the acceleration of automation, coupled with 
fewer new tasks being generated that would require new labor. The authors cautioned that this 
evidence does not mean that the so-called “end of work” is imminent. Rather, they suggested that 
the specific ways in which technology has been recently advancing have not been advantageous 
to labor, because the Displacement Effect has been strongest. This is not necessarily a permanent 
condition, but does provide some clarity to previous conflicting results in this line of research. 
The authors concluded their paper by suggesting some policies that could dampen the 
Displacement Effect and incentivize a change in labor market dynamics.  
 While the current research may lack consensus with regard to the impact of technology 
on productivity in the economy generally, there does appear to be evidence of a boost in 
productivity for the manufacturing sector. With that in mind, goal of this paper is to take a closer 
look, and narrow the focus to the automotive manufacturing sector specifically to determine 
whether productivity gains are attributable to increased technology use and any effects this may 
have on employment levels. The goal is to essentially evaluate whether there is validity to the 
hypothesis of “automating jobs away” using evidence from Ohio autoworkers. Data for this 
project comes from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database. This data set was 
constructed as a joint effort between the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and the 
U.S. Census Bureau’s Center for Economic Studies (CES), and contains data on employment, 
capital investments, productivity, and a host of other measures for the manufacturing industry. 
This data is at the national level, and has been utilized in other prominent literature in this area of 
study. For state level measures, some data was drawn from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS). The This paper focuses on the time period from 1990 to 2011, as this is the period for 
which the overlap of the two datasets contains the most complete data.  
Data – Construction, Sources, and Associated Assumptions 
Before describing the econometric model and empirical methodology, it is important to 
note a few key items about the construction of the dataset. As previously mentioned, the NBER-
CES Database contains a wealth of information on a variety of variables within the 
manufacturing industry. However, this data is at the national level, and therefore not appropriate 
for analysis of one state; at least, not in its given form. The substantial degree of data specificity 
required here – employment levels and output measures, by industry, preferably at a 
geographical level below state-wide – is not readily available from standard aggregators. As 
such, adjustments have been made to the initial dataset the geographic distribution of certain 
variables.  
The BLS dataset features employment levels for Ohio in total and for 12 specific 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs). However, as previously noted, the data specificity (i.e., 
the ability to break down figures by industry) needed here is not readily available at this level. In 
order to correct for this issue, figures were estimated based on state and MSA shares of certain 
variables. For instance, manufacturing employment levels are available by MSA, but there is no 
breakdown that provides the portion of these employees that are in the automotive manufacturing 
sector. In order to estimate this figure, Ohio’s share of national manufacturing in a given year 
was multiplied by the national level of employment in automotive manufacturing in that same 
year. This yields an estimate of the number of people employed in this industry in the state 
within that year. This process is then repeated, but comparing MSA level data to the newly 
generated state-level measures. The result is an estimation of each necessary variable for each 
MSA in each year – a complete data set. This process was implemented primarily for the 
variables of employment, investments, and shipments in order to ensure that measures of these 
most important variables existed for all of the geographic regions. Naturally, this does present 
some limitations and assumptions into the model. The methodology assumes that the Ohio’s 
share of automotive manufacturing labor is similar to its share of overall manufacturing labor. In 
addition, the assumptions extend down further, as it is assumed that each MSA’s share of 
statewide automotive manufacturing employment resembles its respective share of statewide 
manufacturing employment. It could be true that, this is not the case; auto manufacturing could 
be distributed in a different manner due to various factors. Without the exact data, it is difficult 
to know for certain either way. However, this method of distribution is based on the best 
information available. Sound data exists for overall manufacturing employment in each MSA; 
this is the only level of data available. Given this, the method used in this paper to assess the 
respective proportion of that employment that is dedicated to automobile production is based on 
the most reliable information attainable, and the principle used to determine this distribution 
appears to be the most reasonable. 
The NBER-CES database contains not only data for manufacturing as a whole, but allows 
users to be more specific and pull data just for specific kinds of manufacturing. This is because 
the data is sorted according to North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes. 
NAICS codes are simply a number assigned to an industry that allows for an easy means of 
organizing and classifying data according to industry. The codes range from two to six digits, 
with each additional digit adding a greater degree of specificity. For instance, NAICS codes 31 
through 33 represent manufacturing, whereas 336 represents Transportation Equipment 
Manufacturing specifically. For this paper, data was taken from NAICS 3361, Motor Vehicle 
Manufacturing, and 3363, Motor Vehicle Parts Manufacturing. These codes were selected 
because they strike a fair balance between being too granular or too broad. Using a more specific 
NAICS code was considered, but doing so eliminates a large number of firms – for instance, 
using a code that is specific to the final assembly of cars excludes firms that build transmissions. 
By the same token, expanding the selection includes a number of firms who create products that 
are not a part of what is traditionally thought of when conceptualizing auto manufacturing – for 
example, NAICS 3362 includes trailer assembly, which distorts the intended focus of this paper. 
Figure 1 Illustrates this concept. For example, if one were to select NAICS 336111, Automobile 
Manufacturing, the strict definition of this code would mean that nearly every notable 
automotive industry would be excluded – only 3 to 4 assembly plants in the state would be 
included (Honda, FCA, Ford, GM, and Navistar).  
 
Figure 1 – Notable Establishments in Ohio’s Motor Vehicle Industry (Figure prepared by the 
Ohio Development Services Agency, December 2018) 
 
These codes allow the analysis to focus squarely on the key components of automotive 
manufacturing. It is important to discuss the details of the data here, for this plays an important 
role in determining the results of the analysis. Referring back to the example from Figure 1, it is 
clear that an overly specific choice of industry – one that effectively restricts data to four main 
facilities - would paint an incomplete or inaccurate picture. The broadest possible NAICS codes 
were used, and for good reason. Broadening the selection does not necessarily increase the 
number of observations. This is due to the previously discussed fact that the observations are 
according to MSA. No matter how many NAICS codes are chosen to include, there is still only 
one observation per MSA per year. However, a broad selection of NAICS codes still allows for 
more representative results, because it effectively includes a greater portion of  all firms whose 
production is somehow tied to the end product of an automobile. Even with the same number of 
observations, we effectively see a more representative picture of the automotive production 
landscape. NAICS 3361 and 3363 are well-suited for this purpose.  
Empirical Strategy 
  A model loosely based on the structure used by Acemoglu et al (2014) will be used. The 
model is constructed as follows:  
Yt  = β0 + β1FE + β2TI + β3Pro + β4NatAUto + β5ME + ε 
The variable descriptions are as follows: 
Y – Employment, measured in thousands 
β 1 – This variable represents a fixed-effect for MSA, necessary because of the structure 
of the dataset. 
β 2 – This is the variable of interest. It represents the technology intensiveness of a firm, 
or how much their production relies on technology. It is measured as a ratio of capital 
expenditure on machines and equipment to total capital expenditure, therefore illustrating 
how production depends on technology.  
β 3 – This variable represents productivity. It is effectively measured as output per 
worker, calculated by dividing the value of total shipments (units of output) by the 
number of employed workers. The shipment value is controlled for inflation, with 1997 
dollars as the base year.  
β 4 – This variable represents the number of individuals employed in the industry at the 
national level. The idea behind this variable is that it helps to serve as a control for 
national employment trends in the industry, therefore helping to isolate the effect in Ohio.  
β 5 – This is the total manufacturing employment (for all manufacturing industries) in the 
MSA; this serves to control for other economic conditions that would effect employment 
in the MSA, which helps to isolate the effect of technology and machinery on 
employment.  
 
Trends, Results, and Analysis  
The following graphs help to give a visualization of some of the general trends in the 
data. Figure 2 shows the movement of employment in automotive manufacturing in Ohio.  
 
Figure 2 – Total Automotive Manufacturing Employment in Ohio, 1990-2011 
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This graph shows total employment in the state; this graph is total employment in the 
state, rather than being broken down by MSA as the regression analysis is. However, this figure 
still helps to visualize the overall trends in employment. Employment is relatively stable, until 
approximately 1999 to 2000. At this point, a decline begins that generally persists throughout the 
rest of the time period. This is somewhat consistent with what one may expect if the hypothesis 
of automation-driven job loss were true, though the lack of any decline through the 1990s may 
be somewhat inconsistent with that idea. Figure 2 provides some early insight, but is not 
particularly telling in and of itself.  
 
Figure 3 – Equipment Intensity, 1990-2011 
 Figure 3 shows the trend of equipment intensity across the given time period. This figure 
again presents data at the State level, for ease of viewing. The picture here is perhaps surprising 
– intensity peaks in the late 1990s, and then actually begins a decline before somewhat leveling 
off around the time of the Financial Crisis. This would seem to indicate that Ohio auto 
manufacturing firms actually became less dependent on technology and machinery over time. 
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Such a result would go against nearly every intuition one would have, particularly as technology 
appears to play an increasing role in our daily lives – imagine for instance attempting to exist for 
a week without smartphone access. Of note is that the decline in equipment intensity begins 
around the year 2000. This could potentially align with several of the findings from Acemoglu, 
which pointed out that productivity gains from technology began to slow around 2000, as well as 
a slowdown in employment losses around the same time (2014). Though this paper is focused on 
a more specific portion of manufacturing than Acemoglu, this relation merits mentioning. 
However, mere trends in technology usage are not conclusive in and of themselves. 
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Mean Employment by MSA, 1990-2011
MSA Mean Employment (Thousands)
Akron 3.446
Canton 2.476
Cincinnati 8.806
Cleveland 11.287
Columbus 5.947
Dayton 4.138
Lima 0.729
Mansfield 0.979
Springfield 0.683
Toledo 3.366
Steubenville 0.757
Youngstown 3.121  
Figure 4, Mean Employment by MSA, Tabular & Graphical 
Figure 4 gives an overview of employment by Metropolitan Statistical Areas. It shows the mean 
employment across the time period, measured in thousands. There are no real surprises here; in 
general, larger cities are shown to have the largest shares of employment, generally speaking. 
This is logical on theoretical grounds, but is particularly unsurprising given the methodology of 
this paper. As previously mentioned, the number of individuals employed in auto manufacturing 
in a given MSA is estimated; this is done by calculating the share of statewide manufacturing 
employment that the MSA is responsible for, and estimating that the same share of statewide 
automotive manufacturing employment is located in the MSA. Thus, the distribution of auto 
manufacturing employment necessarily follows overall manufacturing employment. These 
means do not reveal the full picture, but it is again helpful to gain introductory insight.  
 
Year Range Mean Employment Shipments/Worker Captial Equipment Ratio
1990-1997 3.871271148 431.8073397 0.095165847
1998-2004 3.858367831 436.2071688 0.10611878
2005-2011 3.813506794 650.0699071 0.105619663
 
Figure 5, Comparison of Means 
Figure 5 allows for a more complete view of the reality. The figure splits the data into 
three time periods, to allow for a visualization of how key variables are moving over time, and 
perhaps hint at how they could potentially influence one another. The Year Ranges are not 
chosen for any specific reason; they are simply set up to split the data into 3 sections as evenly as 
possible. The Mean Employment column shows mean employment across all MSAs. 
Shipments/Worker represents the measure of productivity; as previously noted, it is measured as 
the deflated value of shipments divided by the number of individuals employed. Simply put, it is 
a measure of output per worker. Capital Equipment Ratio is the measure of technology 
dependence – the aforementioned “equipment intensity”, a ratio of the amount of capital 
expenditure on machines and equipment compared to overall capital expenditure. The figure 
reveals important trends for each variable. Employment is shown to be decreasing, as revealed 
by Figure 2. Productivity (Shipments/Worker) experiences a small increase between the first two 
time periods, and then experiences substantially larger growth from the second time period to the 
third. The Capital Equipment ratio provides a sense of numerical magnitude to the trend revealed 
by Figure 3; equipment intensity slightly rises, but then experiences a general decline or 
stagnation. Overall, the insight gained from this figure is mixed. While employment and 
productivity seem to be moving in a way that would be consistent with the automation 
hypothesis, the declining technology investment renders this somewhat inconclusive. From this 
view, it could still be possible that technology is responsible for the overall decline in 
employment, but such a conclusion is anything but clear. Furthermore, the magnitudes of change 
appear to be incredibly small, particularly for employment and equipment intensity (technology 
dependence). These minor changes do not allow for a clear projection of whether the changes are 
significant in a statistical sense. However, this general overview of variation gives the most 
comprehensive conception of the data and variable relationships thus far. With these somewhat 
inconclusive results in mind, we proceed to the regression analysis.  
Regression Results 
Table 1 shows the results of a preliminary regression. The results below show the impact 
of increased technology usage on productivity. As expected, it is shown that increasing 
technology usage has generated greater productivity, controlling for several key variables. The 
results are significant at the 1% level. This is not a surprising result, as it matches intuition and is 
also found in various other research papers on general manufacturing. Even though this 
regression is not the main focus of the paper, and the results may seem somewhat obvious, it is 
still worth including for a few key reasons. First, this result is not necessarily universal in the 
literature. For instance, Acemoglu, et al, found somewhat mixed evidence for technology-driven  
Productivity Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Technology 
and Equipment 
Intensity 
1071.643 368.2762 2.91 0.004 349.8354 1793.451 
Manufacturing 
Employment 
in MSA 
-7.143418 .887638 -8.05 0.000 -8.883157 -5.40368 
National Auto 
Employment 
-.670169 .0439938 -15.23 0.000 -.7563953 -.5839427 
MSA Auto 
Employment 
106.7584 13.43163 7.95 0.000 80.43286 133.0839 
_cons 972.3147 34.86205 27.89 0.000 903.9864 1040.643 
 
Table 1, Productivity Returns from Technology Use 
productivity growth (2014). In light of that, it helps to check if that evidence exists here. 
Additionally, the very basis of the hypothesis examined in this paper – that technology is 
effectively automating jobs away – relies heavily on the assumption that technology allows for 
greater productivity in automotive manufacturing. If in fact, there were no evidence that 
technology use boosts productivity, there would not be much incentive for firms to replace 
workers with machines. At that point, there would have to be a significant cost advantage for 
firms to do so. Therefore, by running this regression, it is shown that the hypothesis is at least 
possible. This evidence basically lays the groundwork for the key regression, by proving that it is 
at least possible or reasonable to think that technological advancement is having some impact on 
employment.  
MSA Auto 
Manufacturing 
Employment 
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Technology 
and Equipment 
Intensity 
-2.479881 1.544664 -1.61 0.108 -5.507367 .5476063 
Productivity .0018368 .0002311 7.95 0.000 .0013838 .0022897 
National Auto 
Manufacturing 
Employment 
.0020347 .0002171 9.37 0.000 .0016091 .0024602 
MSA Total 
Manufacturing 
Employment 
.0658922 .0004263 154.56 0.000 .0650566 .0667278 
_cons -2.492087 .2444014 -10.20 0.000 -2.971105 -2.013069 
Table 2, Impact of Technology on Automotive Manufacturing Employment 
 Table 2 displays the results for the main regression of interest. Technology intensity is 
shown to negatively correlate with employment. However, what is notable is the significance. 
This relationship cannot be said to be statistically significant. It is nearly so at the 10% level, but 
still not enough to merit evidence of causality. This would indicate that there is no evidence that 
technological improvement is a driver of employment declines – simply put, automation is not 
chiefly responsible for declining employment levels in automotive manufacturing in the state of 
Ohio. An interesting finding is the impact of productivity, which is shown to have a slight 
positive impact on employment. In itself, this is entirely expected. However, it is interesting to 
note that, even though technology increases productivity, and productivity has a significant 
positive relationship with employment, the relationship between technology and employment 
does not carry over.  
Conclusion 
 Overall, the findings indicate that there is no evidence that increasing use of technology 
in the production process decreases employment. Technology is a driver of productivity, as 
expected. But, the overall hypothesis of automation as a job killer cannot be substantiated, at 
least for automotive manufacturing in Ohio. This finding would appear to fall in line with the 
results of the Return of the Solow Paradox? paper, which found mixed productivity growth 
associated with technological advancement, but no real evidence of automation as a job killer for 
the overall manufacturing sector. This paper effectively extends these results to a more specific 
geographical and industrial focus.  
 It is possible that these findings are the result of problems in the model. In light of that, 
there are a few key areas in which this model could be improved, or the research extended to 
fully vet the validity of these results. Potentially, the measure of technology usage – the ratio of 
capital expenditure on machinery to total capital expenditure – is flawed. Perhaps a better 
measure exists that could more accurately capture the relationship between technology use and 
employment. Changes to the technology measure was shown to have an impact in previous 
papers, and although the measure here is based on other empirical papers, it is nonetheless 
possible that this measure could be improved. Certainly, this presents an opportunity to re-
evaluate the claims of this paper to effectively check the results. On a final note, assuming the 
results of this paper are an accurate depiction of reality, one specific variable likely holds the 
explanation as to why it cannot be said that technology use hurts employment. The results from 
Figure 3, which showed the change in technology dependence over time, could be the reason for 
these findings. It was shown that technology usage actually became a smaller part of capital 
investment in a relative sense over the time period studied here. This fact is potentially a key 
determinant of the overall findings. Simply put, whatever the reason that firms have become less 
dependent on technology, it is likely an important part of the relationship between technology 
and employment. However, at this point, it appears that claims of humans losing the “race 
against the machine” may be somewhat premature.  
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